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If You Thought the Housing Meltdown Was Bad… |
By Doug Hornig, Senior Editor,
Casey Research
…wait until you see what’s in the cards for
commercial real estate.
That’s right, the next train wreck will be
in commercial real estate. Couldn’t be worse than last year’s
residential market crash? That remains to be seen. But it’s coming
soon, probably as early as the second quarter of next year, and
there’s nothing that can prevent it. The government will intervene,
trying desperately to delay the day of reckoning, and may even
succeed. For a while. But make no mistake about it, that train is
going off the tracks no matter what.
Every part of the sector – from multifamily
apartment buildings to retail shopping centers, suburban office
buildings, industrial facilities, and hotels – has accumulated a huge
amount of defaulted or nonperforming paper. It’s an impossible,
swaying structure that cannot long stand.
Just ask Andy Miller.
Andy is one of the most knowledgeable people
around when it comes to commercial real estate. Co-founder of the
Miller Fishman Group of Denver, he has spent twenty years buying and
developing apartment communities, shopping centers, office buildings,
and warehouses throughout the country. He’s also worked extensively –
especially lately – with asset managers and special servicers (those
who handle commercial mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS) from
insurance companies, conduits, and the biggest banks in the U.S.,
advising them on default scenarios, helping them develop realistic
pricing structures, and making hold or sell recommendations.
It isn’t easy. Commercial real estate sales
are off a staggering 82% in 2009, compared with 2008, and last year
was worse than ’07. No one is selling at depressed prices, but it
hardly matters as there are no buyers, either because they’re afraid
of the market or can’t meet more stringent loan requirements. Two
years ago, the value of all commercial real estate in the U.S. was
about $6.5 trillion. Against that was laid $3-3.5 trillion in loans.
The latter figure hasn’t changed much. But the former has sunk like a
bar of lead in the lake, so that now between half and two-thirds of
those loans will have to be written down, Andy estimates.
“If the banks had to take that hit all at
once, there wouldn’t be any banks,” he says.
And it’s actually worse than that. As even
average citizens became aware during the subprime meltdown, loans in
recent years were bundled into exotic financial vehicles that could be
sold and resold, a class generically known as conduits. These
commercial mortgage-backed securities, while less well known than
their cousins built upon home loans, are nonetheless ubiquitous.
Three guesses who were among the significant
buyers of CMBS. If you said banks, banks, and more banks, you got it.
Thus these folks are sitting not only on their own malperforming
loans, but on a whole lot of everyone else’s toxic junk, too.
This is how bad conduits are: A 3% default
rate last year jumped to 6% in 2009 and is expected to double again,
to 12%, in 2010. An entity that takes a 12% hit to its portfolio – and
this includes countless banks, pension and annuity funds,
international institutional investors, and others – is in deep, deep
trouble.
The real tsunami is coming, probably in the
second quarter of 2010, Andy estimates. Because that’s when banks will
have to start preparing for the wave of mortgages that were written
near the market top and are maturing in 2011-12. Unlike home loans,
commercial loans tend to be relatively short-term in nature (average
5-7 years), because – outside of apartment building loans backed by
Fannie or Freddie – there are no government programs to subsidize
longer-term ones. These guys mature in bunches.
According to a recent Deutsche Bank
presentation, the delinquency rate on commercial loans as of the end
of 2Q09 was greater than 4%. Of these, they expect that north of 70%
will not qualify for refinancing. Imagine what will happen to the
estimated $2 trillion in commercial mortgages that mature between now
and 2013.
And even that is not the end of it. There’s
a second huge wave on the way in 2015-16.
Problem is, instead of trying to meet this
inevitable challenge head on, asset managers have decided to believe
in such phantoms as the tooth fairy, honesty at the Fed, and an
economic turnaround powerful enough to bail them all out. De Nile is
not just a river in Egypt.
To be fair, it’s difficult to envision what
an intelligent, aggressive response would look like, given the breadth
and depth of the crisis, and the lack of resources available to deal
with it. Miller recently met with a group of asset managers from a
number of different, prominent banks. They reported that they’re
completely overwhelmed and can’t even begin to cope with the sheer
volume of problem loans on their calendar. It’s so bad that they’re
now dealing with some borrowers who haven’t paid a cent in a year and
a half.
What do you do if, as Andy thinks is the
case, 85-90% of the entire commercial real estate market is under
water relative to its financing? What happens to a property when its
value drops way below the loan, a seller can’t get enough money to get
out, a buyer can’t raise enough money to get in, and the bank can’t
afford to foreclose? Simple. It just sits there, carried along on the
bank’s books at some inflated “mark to fantasy” price that makes the
institution’s balance sheet look passable. The industry even has a
catchphrase for the situation: “A rolling loan gathers no moss.”
In the case of a retail store, a bankrupt
tenant walks away. Andy looked at just the part of Phoenix where his
firm does business and found 90 vacant big box stores, with an
aggregate floor space of 8 million square feet. If Christmas season is
as lackluster as cash-strapped consumers are likely to make it, there
will be many others to follow.
The hotel business is terrible. Overbuilding
based upon travelers who went into debt to finance lavish vacations is
taking its toll on tourist destinations. At the same time, business
travel has seriously contracted. Flights into Las Vegas, which caters
to both, have been slashed so much that even if every seat on every
remaining flight were filled and visitors stayed for an average number
of days, the hotels still couldn’t break even. In industry parlance,
banks are now engaged in “extend and pretend,” i.e., giving hotels
three- to six-month loan extensions in the hope that things will
somehow improve in the near future.
Office space is doing okay in central
business districts, but not faring well elsewhere. Some estimates tab
the national office vacancy rate at over 16.5%, compared with 12.6% in
January 2008. It exceeds 20% in parts of Atlanta and San Diego, and in
many places in between.
Multifamily apartment buildings – and the
very creaky Fannie and Freddie are carrying a load of them – may be
the next to topple. As values deteriorate and landlords are faced with
loans coming due, there is no incentive to fix whatever goes wrong.
If, for example, you have a $10 million loan maturing in two years,
and the property value has declined to $6 million, why would you spend
half a million to fix leaky roofs? The question answers itself. Yet,
as capital spending needs are not attended to, the apartments
deteriorate. Which leads to working-class tenants replaced by meth
labs. Which leads to even lower property values. And so on. In the
end, when the banks are forced to take possession, they will be left
with either expensive repair jobs, or the cost of demolition and a
total write-off.
As the overall commercial real estate crisis
escalates, the banks will do the same thing they did last year: run to
the government, palms outstretched.
How will Washington respond? Good question.
On the one hand, further bailouts will further infuriate the public.
But on the other, the political sentiment will be that allowing the
banks to fail will have even more dire consequences.
The Fed has already tried to let some of the
relentlessly building pressure out of the balloon through TALF (Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility). But that hasn’t worked,
because TALF only backs the most senior, creditworthy bonds in a CMBS
pool. Those aren’t the problem. The problem is the junior notes no one
wants.
In order to increase market liquidity and
get conduits moving again, the government will likely be forced to
create a guarantee program similar to the FHA, Miller thinks, whereby
short-term money (on the order of 5-7 years) is made available. Will
that just push our problems five to seven years down the road? Quite
possibly. But what is being purchased is time, the only thing left to
buy. The hope, of course, is that it’s enough time – for the real
estate market to stabilize, prices to return to more “normal” levels,
and the world to turn all hunky dory.
Rock, meet hard place. Let all the troubled
banks fail, and the consequences will range from some excruciating but
short-term pain, to a plunge into full-bore depression. Prop them up
with yet more newly printed fiat money, and anything from high to
hyperinflation will inevitably result, along with the possibility of
extending the problem well into the next decade.
Both are frightening prospects. We don’t
want either, but realistically, we’re going to get one or the other.
Let’s be clear, it won’t be the end of the world. However, it will be
the end of the world as we know it. That makes it imperative to
prepare for the new one that’s coming.
The editors of The Casey Report,
supported by real estate pro Andy Miller, have been warning of the
coming commercial real estate debacle since September 2008. This one’s
rather easy to time – because they know when the loans will come due.
And as subscribers can testify, accurately predicting big trends is
the forte of Doug Casey and his expert team. To learn how you can
profit from making the trend your friend,
click here.